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EVchain: An Anonymous Blockchain-Based System for
Charging–Connected Electric Vehicles
Shiyuan Xu, Xue Chen, and Yunhua He
Abstract: Purchases of electric vehicles have been increasing in recent years. These vehicles differ from traditional
fossil-fuel-based vehicles especially in the time consumed to keep them running. Electric-Vehicle-charging Service
Providers (EVSPs) must arrange reasonable charging times for users in advance. Most EVSP services are based
on third-party platforms, but reliance on third-party platforms creates a lack of security, leaving users vulnerable
to attacks and user-privacy leakages. In this paper, we propose an anonymous blockchain-based system for
charging-connected electric vehicles that eliminates third-party platforms through blockchain technology and the
establishment of a multi-party security system between electric vehicles and EVSPs. In our proposed system, digital
certificates are obtained by completing distributed Public Key Infrastructure (distributed-PKI) identity registration,
with the user registration kept separate from the verification process, which eliminates dependence on the EVSP
for information security. In the verification process, we adopt smart contracts to solve problems associated with
centralized verification and opaque services. Furthermore, we utilize zero-knowledge proof and ring-signature
superposition to realize completely anonymous verification, which ensures undeniability and unforgeability with no
detriment to anonymity. The evaluation results show that the user anonymity, information authenticity, and system
security of our system fulfill the necessary requirements.
Key words: blockchain; Electric Vehicles (EV); zero knowledge proof; distributed Public Key Infrastructure (distributed-PKI);
ring signature; smart contract
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Introduction

With the development of technology in recent years,
including parking assistance and smart start-stop
technology, smart cars have become increasingly
popular[1] . A subclass of the smart car is the Electric
Vehicle (EV), which is powered by an electromotor
rather than the gasoline of conventional vehicles, which
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takes relatively little time to fill the tank and requires
no advance booking. In contrast, the charging time of
the EV is time-consuming, requiring that EV charging
Service Providers (EVSPs) be scheduled in advance to
arrange a reasonable time for the user vehicles to be
charged. So, the establishment of EVSPs is necessary
for people who use EVs.
Today, most EVSP systems are based on third-party
organizations and rely on a centralized client-server
architecture. In this centralized mode, service providers
have the authority to access all of the EVs’ information,
which causes secuirity issues and vulnerability to
leakage of private user information. Based on this leaked
information, adversaries can infer other information
about private users. Today, security and privacy issues
are attracting increasing attention[2–5] . Protecting the
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private information of clients is vital, which is the main
problem we resolve in this paper.
The development of a blockchain in distributed
ledger architecture provides a viable option. In this
paper, we propose an anonymous EV charging system
based on blockchain. Our system uses blockchain
technology to solve the problem of centralized security
via a shared, distributed, tamper-proof, and faulttolerant database[6, 7] . Smart contracts are used to ensure
automation and transparency in the verification process.
Examples of the use of blockchain include supply
chain management[8] and the Internet of Things (IoTs)[9] .
However, blockchain has not been widely used in EVs.
Because blockchain can ensure truly distributed security,
relevant user information cannot be disclosed to third
parties.
Moreover, to ensure the anonymity of our system
and make the information even safer, we use hash
values during the registration of EV users and the Kanonymity method at the charging station. We also use a
distributed Public Key Infrastructure (distributed-PKI),
which provides registration legitimacy as an EVSP must
collect and store this information. Lastly, we leverage
zero-knowledge proof and ring signature technologies
to modify EVSP identity to achieve undeniability,
unconditional anonymity, and unforgeability.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) An anonymous blockchain-based system for
charging-connected electric vehicles is proposed, in
which blockchain technology is used to eliminate the
need for trust of and dependence on EVSPs. Using smart
contracts, the EV verification process is also automated
and transparent.
(2) Privacy protection technologies, such as zeroknowledge proof, ring signature, and K-anonymity, are
used to ensure the anonymity and privacy of the EV users
in the system.
(3) The feasibility of the system has been verified via
security analysis and experimentation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we review related work in EV charging.
Current systems and treatment models are discussed in
Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce and provide details
regarding our system architecture. Evaluations of the
anonymity, authenticity, and security of our proposed
system are presented in Section 5. Lastly, we draw our
conclusions in Section 6.

2
2.1

Related Work
Cryptography privacy approaches in EV
charging

In recent years, many researchers have studied ways
to preserve the privacy of EV users[10] . To protect
both the identity and location of EV users, research in
cryptography has included homomorphic encryption, Kanonymity, hash values, and pseudonyms.
Homomorphic encryption is a widely used approach
that has also been adopted by some researchers to
protect the locations and databases of EV users[11] . This
framework can hide user information based on distance
calculations. Although this approach can safeguard
privacy, total homomorphic encryption of the EV system
is required, which is time intensive and limits the
capability of other complex functions. Therefore, we
choose not to adopt this method for our system.
Many researchers prefer K-anonymity to protect user
privacy, which protects the relationship between usersensitive data and individual identity[12] . This method
guarantees that in a set of k similar elements, the target
is indiscernible from other k 1 elements[13] . Thus, the
probability of finding the target user is greatly reduced
to 1=k. Therefore, we use K-anonymity in our system
to protect the privacy of the charging information.
Hash values are another cryptology approach used
to secure user information. Some scholars consider
hash values to be one of the most secure encryption
algorithms, and this method is used comprehensively
in blockchain systems. Hash values have many
characteristics that serve to protect the privacy of users,
including strong collision resistance, weak collision
resistance, and irreversibility. Furthermore, whatever
its input, the output of this method is always 256-bit
long. Therefore, it represents a perfect choice in our
system.
Pseudonyms have been used extensively for privacy
in some cases and were suggested as appropriate for EV
users in the IEEE 1609.2 standard[14] . Although this
standard is assigned by some trusted third authorities,
it only prevents information leakage to untrustworthy
parties.
2.2

Zero-knowledge proof

Zero-knowledge proof was proposed by Goldwasser et
al.[15] in the late 1980s. It refers to the ability of the
prover to convince the verifier that a certain assertion
is correct without providing any useful information to
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the verifier. In the EV charging system, the application
of zero-knowledge proof can verify the validity of a
transaction without revealing, the user’s identity or
address, thereby ensuring users privacy and anonymity.

3

Current Systems and Threat Model

In this section, we review some current system
models and identify underlying threat models. First, we
summarize current EV system models that ignore privacy
while incorporating blockchain. Then, we analyze how
assailants undermine user privacy in current systems and
identify their methods for doing so.
3.1

Current systems

In the current model, the designers do not take privacy
into consideration.
As shown in Fig. 1[16] , when EVs require charging,
EV users must apply to an EVSP. The EVSP then
generates a secret function and two keys. The users
need to unlock the secret function to verify their identity,
and validation process for those who intend to search
for charging stations is so weak that users must only
input some numbers that are equal to or greater than the
original numbers provided. Therefore, if a person inputs
some large numbers, he can obtain authentication for
any EVs.
Researchers have also considered the security of
customer information using the K-anonymity algorithm,
but they ignore the fact that the fewer the users, the
worse their level of protection[12] . For example, if there
are three users, the anonymity set falls to a 3-anonymity
set, which means that an adversary has a probability of
p D 1=3 of accurately determining the others.
Considering these privacy leakage issues, in our
system, we utilize distributed-PKI to safeguard security,

which we introduce below.
3.2

Basic notions

In our systems, if not specifically mentioned, we use
keys 256-bits long and hash functions, and append
digital signatures based on the standard digital signature
algorithm with Advanced Encryption Standard AES-256
symmetric encryption.
Table 1 lists the basic notations we use in the paper.
Three key pairs are used in this paper: .PKU ; SKU / is
offered via the distributed-PKI systems, .PKC ; SKC /
is used to generate a zero-knowledge proof Zkp , and
.PKr ; SKr / represents the key pair of each user in the
ring signature. Note that except .PKU ; SKU /, we do not
utilize the Diffie-Hellman (DH) scheme for the public
key pairs. Moreover, we let h denote a hash value
customized by SHA-256, which is generated in one step.
Then, to verify their true identities, we use sigPKU .PKI/
as the digital signature for the users, and SignR to
represent the ring signature. The three tokens[17] are
represented by Tv-s , Ts-c , and Tc-p . Other basic notations
are introduced in the following.
3.3

Threat model

Attackers of the current model can obtain an abundance
of information, including user behavior patterns, as
shown in Table 2.
From Table 2, we can see that “fc1a4...2fd01” always
charges at noon, “hae04...9da34” always charges in the
afternoon, and “a1830...1b321” often charges at night.
Thus, an adversary could deduce EV user habits after a
few days.
In addition, the following threats occur frequently in
Table 1

Notation
(PKU , SKU )
h
Zkp
sigPKU (PKI)
(PKC , SKC )
(PKr , SKr )
SignR
k
H.x/
HM
pi

Fig. 1

Current model.
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d
Tv-s
Ts-c
Tc-p

Basic notation.
Definition
Key pair for registration
Hash value of the EV users identity information
Zero-knowledge proof
User’s digital signature for PKI
Key pair for zero-kowledge proof
Key pair for ring signature
Signature of zero-knowledge proof
Number of members in an anonymous group
Entropy value
Maximum entropy
Probability of identifying the i -th individual
in the anonymity set with k members
Anonymity degree
Token used for schedule verification
Token used for charge verification
Token used for payment verification
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Table 2

Information recorded on the blockchain.
Timestamp
Timestamp
sigPKU (PKI)
of records
of validations
fc1a4...2fd01
2020-7-21 11:31
2020-7-21 11:32
fc1a4...2fd01
2020-7-26 11:53
2020-7-26 11:55
hae04...9da34
2020-7-21 14:42
2020-7-21 14:45
hae04...9da34
2020-7-22 15:02
2020-7-22 15:03
hae04...9da34
2020-7-24 14:51
2020-7-24 14:53
hae04...9da34
2020-7-26 15:10
2020-7-26 15:14
a1830...1b321
2020-7-22 22:22
2020-7-22 22:26
a1830...1b321
2020-7-23 22:46
2020-7-23 22:48
a1830...1b321
2020-7-26 23:13
2020-7-26 23:14

decentralized systems (Fig. 2).
(1) EVSP attack
Given that the registration database relies on the EVSP
system, we have to assume that if some staff members
are not trustworthy, they could become curious about
the private information of EV users when scheduling
charging services. It is possible for the staff members
to view or disclose private user information out of sheer
curiosity. This leads to the untrustworthiness of the
entire centralized EVSP system.
(2) Man-in-the-middle attack
There may be malicious attackers in systems who can
easily capture information from EV scheduling requests
received by an EVSP. Having analyzed this information,
attackers can then determine user habits and behavior
patterns.
(3) Public ledger attack
Blockchain is a publicly distributed ledger in which
all system transactions are open and transparent, which
enables each node to access any information on the
blockchain to quickly reach a consensus. However, when
users are authenticated in the blockchain, their private
data can be threatened.
(4) Replay attack
To obtain a second charge service, an unethical

Fig. 2

Attack model for our application.

or malicious user can resubmit authenticated data for
repeated authentication.
(5) Denial-of-service attack
The baleful EVs may deliberately take up charging
time or an unethical EV may also deliberately take up
charging time or occupy a parking space after charging,
which can result in subsequently booked vehicles being
unable to charge or having insufficient charging time.
(6) Strong- and weak-collisions attack
We must assume that malicious users may try to
reverse their anonymous identities. There may also
be situations in which the identity certificates of two
anonymous users are the same.

4

System Architecture

In this section, we provide an overview of our proposed
system and describe the system components in detail.
4.1

System overview

To protect the privacy of EV users, we propose a system
that combines hash values and K-anonymity in the
registration, with distributed-PKI to verify the true EVSP
identity and create a certification for EVs to confirm their
identity. In typical circumstances, our system includes
three phases: registration, charge scheduling, and charge
payment. Figure 3 shows a scheme of this process.
During the registration phase, a user submits a
registration application to the distributed-PKI using the
hash value of his/her true identity. The distributed-PKI
utilizes Registration BlockChain (RBC) and Certificate
BlockChain (CBC) node voting to reach a consensus and
issue the digital certificate. The EVSP must also register
with the distributed-PKI.
In the charge scheduling phase, the user sends a
charge request to the EVSP. A pair of .SKC ; PKC / is
generated when the EVSP receives a request. Then, the
user submits a digital certificate, SKC , and timestamp
to generate a zero-knowledge proof Zkp . Three smart
contracts are also deployed on the CBC in which the
“verify” smart contract is embedded with PKC . The user
then performs a ring signature on the zero-knowledge
proof and submits it to the “verify” smart contract
for verification. When the user has been authenticated,
the EV system will distribute a token to the user as a
passport for subsequent actions. Three tokens are used
in our system for scheduling, charging, and payment,
respectively. These tokens ensure that the scheduling,
charging, and payment operations are separate, thereby
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Fig. 3

Anonymous blockchain-based system for charging-connected electric vehicles.

protecting the anonymity of the EV user.
If a user identity is verified, a Tv-s token is issued.
The user must then submit the encrypted scheduling
information, a token Tv-s and a deposit to the “schedule”
smart contract. Once verified, EVSP will schedule and
issue a Ts-c token to the user. Finally, often when the
EV arrives at the charging station, user has to submit
the Ts-c token, and RBC verifies its location information.
The charging process will begin and a Tc-p token will be
issued for payment upon verification.
In the payment phase, the charging station will
confirm receipt of the Tc-p token and send a bill to the
user. If the user confirms that information is correct,
payment will be made using virtual currency and a
signature. After the charging station receives payment,
the payment must be confirmed and signed, and then
recorded on the blockchain.
4.2

849

Registration

The registration phase is divided into two parts. First,
the user registration information is uploaded and
cryptography is used to ensure anonymity. Then, a
certification for the user is provided using the distributedPKI method.
PKI is a standard public-key cryptographic
management platform that combines user key pairs and
a public-key certificate management system to issue
certificates. However, traditional PKI is centralized
and relies on the security of a third-party certification
authority, which may cause security and privacy issues.

Therefore, we adopt a distributed-PKI system to
complete the registration.
In this phase, the EV user must register his/her
ID, payment address, and EV information. In our
system, when users apply for registration, we require
that they register with a hash value h for the true identity
information and generate a digital certificate sigPKU .PKI/
for authentication by two blockchains,
h D hashvalue.ID; paymentaddress;
EVinformation/

(1)

In this scheme, we utilize some properties of the hash
values, such as their uniqueness, unidirectionality, and
anti-weak collision, which cannot be used to reversedecrypt the EV user’s real identity. Although a small
number of people may know user’s true information and
obtain their hash value, most of them are family and
friends whom we assume to be trustworthy and pose no
threat.
We then utilize the K-anonymity algorithm to ensure
anonymity, which guarantees that in a set of k similar
information, the target information is indistinguishable
from other k 1 information[13] . Therefore, the
probability of finding the real information is 1=k [18] .
The degree of anonymity relies on the member accounts
in the anonymity k group. Practically speaking, Kanonymity privacy requires a private server from a
trusted third party[18] .
After obtaining the hash value for the user’s
information, we use K-anonymity to ensure the
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anonymity of our system. To measure the degree of
anonymity, information entropy can be proposed to the
privacy group, whereby we assume that every individual
in the anonymity model of x represents an information
point, so we take H.x/ to determine its entropy value.
Then, we assume Zkp is the possibility of analyzing the
i-th member in the anonymity set with k members,
k
X
H.x/ D
pi log2 .pi /
(2)
i D1

HM is the maximum possible entropy in the Kanonymity set when all k members have the same
possibility, i.e., 1=k, to be searched by other people.
Thus, we obtain
HM D log2 .k/
(3)
Moreover, the total information that attackers can
obtain can be expressed as[19]
HM H.x/
(4)
HM
On this basis, the degree of anonymity is defined by
Seys et al.[20] as follows:
H.x/
HM H.x/
D
(5)
d D1
HM
HM
To verify the user’s true identity, we utilize the
distributed-PKI method to generate a user certificate.
The distributed-PKI consists of RBC, CBC, and EV.
After the user has submitted h to the client, the
distributed-PKI generates a pair of key .SKU ; PKU /. The
user uses the private key to sign the information and send
to the RBC,
D Sign.h; SKU /
(6)
The RBC will vot, and consensus nodes verify vi ,
vi D verify. ; PKU /
(7)
The client then sends a certificate application to the
CBC, which will verify, vote, and generate a digital
certificate .sigPKU .PKI//.
From Fig. 4, we can see that the RBC is used for
identification, encryption of the EV identity information,
and storage of authenticated EV data. The CBC node
is responsible for verification of the validity of the
EV, generation of a certificate to authenticate the EV
information and EV service information, preservation
of undisclosed digital certificates, and maintenance of
anonymous digital certificate data. In each blockchain,
we use a concurrent Byzantine fault tolerance consensus
to assure compatibility, for hard modification of EVs
with respect to the nodes, and to protect the consistency
of the blockchain[21] .

Fig. 4

4.3

Distributed-PKI system composed of CBC and RBC.

Charging scheduling

In the charge scheduling phase, we complete three
steps: verification, scheduling, and charging of the EV.
First, we create the user’s zero-knowledge proof and
three corresponding smart contracts. Next, we deploy
three smart contracts on the blockchain. Lastly, the user
enters a ring signature on the zero-knowledge proof and
submits it to the smart contracts on the blockchain for
verification.
4.3.1

Step 1

When the user desires to charge the EV, he must submit
a charge application to the EVSP via the client. Then,
the user must submit proof that he/she has already
registered. In the registration stage, the user completes
the registration of identity in the distributed-PKI and
receives a digital certificate .sigPKU .PKI//. Thus, the
user can submit sigPKU .PKI/ to verify his/her identity.
As shown in Fig. 5, the EVSP will distribute a pair
of key .SKC ; PKC / from the Common Reference String
(CRS)[22] and send the SKC to the EV user. Then, the
EVSP will create a smart contract with the PKC . A smart

Fig. 5 Step 1: EVSP distributes (SKC , PKC ) and creates
smart contract. Furthermore, the user creates a zeroknowledge proof for subsequent verification.
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contract is a computer protocol that propagates, verifies,
or informally executes a contract, which is deployed on
the blockchain and pre-sets the rules regarding triggered
events and responses. Smart contracts are based on
reliable and untampered data that automatically execute
pre-set rules and respond accordingly. Using “verify”
smart contracts in our system serves to decentralize
the verification process and make the services more
transparent. Lastly, a user utilizes the digital certificate
sigPKU .PKI/, SKC , and timestamp together to generate a
zero-knowledge proof.
4.3.2 Step 2
In this step, we deploy the “verify”, “schedule”, and
“charge” smart contracts on the CBC when it has
been created. To write the smart contracts, we utilize
the Zokrates tool and Solidity native language. This
operation can be briefly described as consisting of
three processes. The first is to perform the secure
setup operation to generation the CRS. Next, the zeroknowledge proof is generated using the command
generate-proof. Lastly, the export-verifier command is
used to export the required smart contract. The PKC key
is embedded in the “verify” smart contract to validate the
zero-knowledge proof Zkp of the user. As blockchain is
decentralized and distributed, no third party is required
to facilitate validation. Thus, we can effectively prevent
malicious fraud and data tampering, and resolve the
security problem.
4.3.3 Step 3
In the third step, users must ring-sign the zeroknowledge proof. A ring signature is a digital signature
scheme originally proposed by Rivest et al.[23] . In this
scheme, ring members need not cooperate. The sign
verifier only certifies the correctness of the signature
without needing to know whose it is. Therefore, the
ring signature meets the requirements of correctness,
unconditional anonymity, and unforgeability.
As shown in Fig. 6, first, a key pair is generated
for the user by the Probabilistic Polynomial-Time
(PPT) algorithm. Next, we enter the user’s private
keys, zero-knowledge proofs, and the public keys of
the ring members for signature. Last, the signature,
zero-knowledge proof, and public keys of the ring
members are submitted to the “verify” smart contract
of the blockchain for verification. The smart contract
determines whether the verification should be approved
or not. During this process, the user’s digital certificate
sigPKU .PKI/, and timestamp are also approved by the

Fig. 6 Three steps of ring signature: generation, signature
and verification.

blockchain. Having been successfully authenticated, the
“verify” smart contract issues a Tv-s token to the user
and stores related information for subsequent scheduling
verification.
Next is the scheduling verification process. As shown
in Fig. 7, the user submits the Tv-s token, a guarantee
deposit, and encrypted scheduling information to the
“schedule” smart contract on the blockchain. As the
EVSP interacts with smart contracts, it can receive
the encrypted scheduling information to schedule an
appropriate time slot for the Tv-s token user. After
verification, the “schedule” smart contract will withdraw
the Tv-s token and return a Ts-c token to the EV to allow
it to be charged at a predetermined charging station.
When the EV arrives at the charging station at its
designated charging time slot, charging station receives
the Ts-c token at its own address. Then, EV charging
station verifies the Ts-c token of the EV user to ensure that
its identity and schedule are verified. Basically, it uses
the token to connect with the “charge” smart contract
and receives related identity and schedule information
for comparison.
To prevent malicious users from taking this charging
slot, we also request the location of the EV vehicle with
the identity information. When the user arrives at the
charging station, the Ts-c token and location information
must be verified. However, user’s privacy may be
compromised during this process. Therefore, we use
a random combination of users at nearby locations in
the K-anonymous group to hide the user’s personal
information. If the verification is approved, the Ts-c
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Fig. 7 Step 3: EV user submits required information to the smart contract and verifies it. All relevant informations will be
stored on the blockchain.

token is reclaimed and the user is allowed to charge.
After charging is complete, a Tc-p token is distributed to
the user for subsequent payment, and related information
is stored.
4.4

Charging payment

In this section, we describe how the user pays for
the electricity used when the EV charging process is
complete.
Having charged the EV, the user received a Tc-p token
to prove that charging has been completed for payment.
The charging station will send its charging time and
a unit charging price to the payer, as shown in Fig. 8.
After the payer receives the bill, the payment will be
made after confirmation. The transaction is recorded in
the blockchain to verify the legality of the transaction.
The charging station will eventually publish payment
information in units of K-anonymous groups to prevent
tampering. Users know their own charging time and
payment amount, so they can identify their own billing
information, but no others can infer details of the hidden
information.

Fig. 8

5
5.1

Evaluation
Anonymity analysis

In this section, we explain how anonymity is ensured
in the EV system. Of primary importance is that the
hash value is irreversible, anti-collision, and cannot
be cracked. The digital certificate generated by the
distributed-PKI provides the user with an identity with
the EVSP. When the user wants to charge his/her
EV, he/she must submit the zero-knowledge proof to
the smart contract, which can perform authentication
without providing any private information. Furthermore,
the token issued by the smart contract allows users
to be verified without submitting any relevant identity
information. Last, due to the nature of the K-anonymous
group, the probability of an adversary finding the real
user is only 1=k.
In Figs. 9 and 10, we show the time and charging
degree of ten groups of users at charging Station A. We
can see that the anonymous group is not used in Fig. 9.
A malicious attacker can easily analyze the charging
habits and vehicle battery capacity of each EV. The users’

Charging bill details.
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Fig. 9 Charging statistics of Station A before using Kanonymity.

Fig. 11

Fig. 10 Charging statistics of Station A after using Kanonymity.

information in Fig. 9 is fully exposed, but in Fig. 10,
due to the use of anonymous groups, it is difficult for us
to analyze users behavior patterns at a glance, so their
personal information remains hidden.
Next, we qualify and evaluate the degree of anonymity
of our system for comparison with other systems. To do
so, we transform Eq. (5) as
Pfollows:
.pi  log2 .pi //
H.x/

 D
dD
D
P
1
1
HM
 log2
k
k
P
.pi  log2 .pi //
(8)
log2 .k/
Using the System A[12] as an example, we explain
our method for calculating the degree of anonymity
as follows: Assuming that there are 10 000 users in
the system, each user must re-apply for a pseudonym
when every time he/she charges, so each user has 500
pseudonyms to protect their privacy. We assume an EV
charge life of 500 charges, so 500 transactions must be
recorded for each user on the blockchain. So, the entropy
is H.x/ D log2 .10 000  500/  22:26. However,
when all users are completely anonymous, the maximum
entropy value should be HM D log2 .10 000  500 
500/  30:48. Therefore, the degree of anonymity of
System A in this example is
H.x/
22:26
dD
D
 0:731:
HM
30:48
As shown in Fig. 11, we evaluated three systems:
System A[12] , System B[16] , and our proposed system.
Most existing systems are centralized EVSPs, which can
cause user privacy issues. In our system, users use a

Degree of anonymity in three systems.

hash value to register with the distributed-PKI, so there
is no need to trust the EVSP. Thus, the anonymity of
our system will never be reduced to 0. System A uses
pseudonyms and has a trust-based EVSP, so its degree
of anonymity is always lower than that of our system.
System B, which only uses K-anonymity, is so simple
that its degree of anonymity is always lower than both
System A and our system.
5.2

Authenticity analysis

In addition to anonymity, our system also guarantees
authenticity, which is rarely mentioned in other systems.
First, a distributed-PKI is specifically used for managing
identity registration and certificate generation. In our
system, users must register with the distributed-PKI to
obtain a digital certificate, which guarantees authenticity
of the identity of EV users. Next, we add a timestamp to
the zero-knowledge proof generation process to prevent
replay attacks. The smart contract verifies the time that
the zero-knowledge proof was received. If that time
is within the validity period of the proof, the proof is
validated, otherwise, it is rejected. We also use ring
signatures on the proof to prevent the zero-knowledge
proof from being stolen or tampered with.
The process for applying a ring signature is as follows:
First, define the function,
Cl;y .y1 ; y2 ; y3 ; : : : ; yn / D El .yn ˚ El .yn 1 ˚
El .   y2 ˚ El .y1 ˚ El /// D vi

(9)

where El is a symmetric encryption algorithm and l is
the symmetric key corresponding to El .
Use public key PKr -n to encrypt random number xn ,
which can be expressed as
yn D gn .xn /
(10)
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Use a corresponding private key SKr -n to decrypt yn ,
which can be expressed as
xn D gn 1 .yn /
(11)
Taking user EV-1 as an example, we apply a perform
ring signature and verify that signature.
The process of generating a ring signature is as
follows:
(1) Using the following formula, find El and the
corresponding symmetric key l,
l D hash.Zkp /
(12)
(2) Randomly select a number .
(3) Randomly select n 1 values .x2 ; x3 ; : : : ; xn /, and
calculate .y2 ; y3 ; : : : ; yn / using Eq. (10).
(4) Find the y1 value by solving the following
equation:
Cl;y .y1 ; y2 ; : : : ; yn / D v
(13)
(5) Consider y1 as being encrypted by the public key
PKr -1. As the user has the corresponding private key, x1
can be obtained by decrypting y1 by Eq. (11).
(6) Finally, obtain the ring signature E .
E D.PKr -1; PKr -2; : : : ; PKr -nI vI x1 ; x2 ; : : : ; xn /
(14)
The process of verifying the signature is as follows:
(1) The verifier has a public key .PKr -1; PKr -2; : : : ;
PKr -n/ and obtains.y2 ; y3 ; : : : ; yn / by the encryption of
Eq. (10) and the corresponding .x1 ; x2 ; : : : ; xn /.
(2) Calculate the symmetric key used for El by
Eq. (12).
(3) Verify Eq. (13). If it is true, it will be approved for
verification, otherwise it will be returned.
Using the above signature and verification process, we
can see that the ring signature can verify the authenticity
of the message by ensuring the anonymity of the user,
and the ring signature cannot be forged.
Finally, after the charging is complete, the user will
receive a bill from the charging station. After confirming
that it is correct, the user will pay and sign. The charging
station must also sign after receiving the payment and
store it on the blockchain to verify that the bill is
true and valid. This evaluation process ensures that the
authenticity of our system is better than that of other
systems.
5.3

Security analysis

In Section 3.3, a number of threat models were identified,
which are resolved by the use of our system:
(1) EVSP attack
We use the storable distributed-PKI system for

registration. This information is the only digital
certificate generated by the distributed-PKI.
(2) Man-in-the-middle attack
User scheduling information is encrypted and cannot
be cracked. In addition, we use the digital certificate
issued by the distributed-PKI as the identity and apply
K-anonymity to protect user privacy.
(3) Public ledger attack
Attackers can access public ledger information and
obtain the user’s charging time, charging power, etc. For
the following reasons, we believe that this type of attack
is impossible in our system:
 A token system is used in our system, and all
information is completely encrypted.
 We use K-anonymity to desensitize user
information. The probability of identifying a real
EV user is only 1=k.
 When performing charging verification, each user
deposits the same amount, and it is impossible to trace
information of the same amounts.
(4) Replay attack
A timestamp is added when generating the zeroknowledge proof. Having received the proof, to prevent
replay attack, the smart contract on the blockchain will
verify whether the current time is within the valid period.
(5) Denial-of-service attack
As each EV user must pay a deposit upon receiving
all verifications, it is impossible to forcibly occupy the
charging station or to be refused service.
(6) Strong- and weak-collisions attacks
We utilize hash values to resist strong and weak
collisions. The hash function maps data of any length to
a domain of finite length. The possibility that the hash
values of two different data will be the same is extremely
small. In addition, it is difficult to identify data based on
its hash value.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based system
for charging connected electric vehicles. We utilize
distributed-PKI and EVSP, respectively, to provide
registration and charge scheduling services. Combining
the use of zero-knowledge proof, ring signature, and
K-anonymity, we achieve anonymity with respect to user
identity and location information. Blockchain smart
contracts are also used to ensure service transparency
and automatic verification. Our system does not require
that a third-party institution, like an EVSP, be trusted.
Our evaluation and analysis results confirm that the

Shiyuan Xu et al.: EVchain: An Anonymous Blockchain-Based System for Charging–Connected Electric Vehicles

anonymity, authenticity, and security of the proposed
system are guaranteed and exceed those of the current
systems.
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